The Economics of Incentivising Creativity and Innovation Through IP

About this project
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Martin Kretschmer Jaakko Miettinen
Lead investigator(s):
- Prof Martin Kretschmer
Contributor(s):
- Mr Jaakko Miettinen

Start Date: 1st September 2014
End Date: 31st December 2016

Summary

The research will be carried out using experiments which mimic the structure of IP laws so it can be observed how the different strengths and structures of IP laws incentivise creativity. For example, a copyright is relatively easy to get compared to a patent but once one is received the financial gains are very unequal with most of the financial gains going to a few of the most successful creators. So to mimic this structure the experiment would be split into two stages, the first stage being a creative task where it is easy to continue to the second stage. Once the subject has advanced to the second stage I.e. received a copyright for their creation the financial pay-out will be very unequal with a small percentage reaping most of the reward. The idea here is to see how the two stage structure which has a tournament element in the second stage incentivises creativity. There will be a two stage game for patents with the requirements for receiving patents being higher but in the second stage the pay-outs will be more equal. This is in order to mirror the real world structure of patent law and expected patent pay-outs. Since I am a first year PhD the details of the experiments are still unclear but the overall idea is relatively set. Games incorporating creative tasks will be used in the experiments in order to mirror the different structures and environments brought on by copyright and patent laws according to relevant legal literature and game theory will be used to interpret these findings.